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Abstract 
Economic crises are associated with large shocks to beliefs and expectations. Thus, their 
study includes the strategies that economic actors use to interpret and anticipate the 
evolution of their environment. In this setting, we start with a brief review of argu-
ments on the possibilities and limitations of probabilistic approaches in economic con-
texts. Then, we discuss some accounts of the recent macroeconomic crisis, focusing on 
the problems which arise in predicting the dynamics of non- ergodic systems. Further, 
we concentrate on the various ways in which agents rationalize an economic path that 
will eventually be perceived as an unsustainable bubble. We conclude by stressing the 
relevance of paying attention to the concrete practices of actors in forming representa-
tions of the economy and determining expectations. 
Key words: expectations, uncertainty, crises. 
Resumen
Las crisis económicas están asociadas con importantes shocks a las creencias y expecta-
tivas. Por eso, su estudio incluye las estrategias prácticas usadas por los agentes para in-
terpretar y anticipar la evolución de su entorno. En este contexto, comenzamos con una 
revisión de los argumentos sobre las posibilidades y limitaciones de los enfoques pro-
babilísticos en economía. Luego discutimos algunas explicaciones de las recientes crisis 
macroeconómicas, concentrándonos en los problemas que surgen en la predicción de 
las dinámicas de sistemas no-ergódicos. Posteriormente, nos ocupamos de los variados 
modos en que los agentes racionalizan un proceso económico que eventualmente des-
emboca en una burbuja insostenible. Concluimos enfatizando la relevancia de prestar 
atención a las prácticas concretas de los actores en la formación de representaciones de 
la economía y en la determinación de sus expectativas.
Palabras clave: expectativas, incertidumbre, crisis.
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Introduction.
Whatever its detailed characteristics, a macroeconomic crisis represents 
by its very nature a widespread disappointment of expectations manifest-
ed in numerous “broken promises”, particularly in the form of unfulfilled 
debt contracts  (Leijonhufvud 2004; Heymann 2007).  While a crisis may 
be triggered by some “external shock”, in large- scale events like the re-
cent crisis in the US and the EU the disturbance appears to have been 
generated by the dynamics of the economies themselves. In this paper we 
address these topics in the context of the study of financial crises; in par-
ticular, we comment the role of behaviors based on the rationalization of 
observed performances in the development of macroeconomic bubbles, 
by creating the presumption that ultimately unsustainable paths have “fun-
damental” underpinnings. However, the general reference to the presence 
of deep uncertainty and structural change leaves substantive questions 
open about how agents deal in practice with those features of their en-
vironments in order to anticipate and plan their actions, and what makes 
these take a course that ends in a crisis.  
1. Probabilities as instruments to tame uncertainty.
Normal human beings look for psychological certainty. They want to 
know about past and present things, but above all, about the future. As 
Martha Nussbaum (2001, p. 154) notes, the problems stemming from 
ungoverned luck in human life motivated Plato to develop his philosophi-
cal art. His dialogue Protagoras relates the story of the progressive human 
efforts to control contingency. In this task, numbering and measuring are 
central keys. What is immeasurable and incommensurable has to be made 
measurable and commensurable in any way possible. 
This result provides akribeia or precision. Numbers are homogeneous 
and practical. Expressing realities in numbers facilitates decisions. How 
can we reduce choice about qualitative features or about future uncertain 
events to a quantitative calculation? This is the question raised by Plato. He 
asked: ‘What science will save us from the unpredictable contingency?’ 
and answered: “the science of measurement” (Protagoras, 356e). Human 
beings strive for security, and measurement helps to get it. Social institu-
tions apply standards, proceedings and measurement devices as a means 
to systematize behaviors.
The idea that degrees of probability can attributed to some facts was al-
ready considered in the Middle Ages by the confessors. However, it did 
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not adopt a mathematical form until modern times1. Probability puts in 
brackets the contingency of the particular case and, at the same time, 
takes it into account: playing roulette does not provide certainty, but be-
ing informed about the odds of the roulette one is playing with provides 
a great deal of knowledge about the situation (and, probably, it removes 
much psychological stress from the game). 
The assignment of probabilities to social events raises the question of 
whether all realities can adequately be reduced to numbers. Numbers are 
the expression of a real accident of substances: quantity. However, even 
when applied to things naturally quantitative like extension, for example, 
defining a numerical expression requires establishing metrics. Numbers 
can also be applied to qualities like temperature or even beauty, and simi-
larly to the quality of being more or less probable. The conventions in-
volved in these applications may be more or less “firm”, depending on the 
nature of the quality considered. It is more objective to measure tempera-
ture by a thermometer than to decide the winner of a beauty contest (but, 
even here, temperature is not a cardinal variable). 
Warnings about the actual inevitability of contingency in economic mat-
ters and about the difficulties inherent in trying to reduce uncertainty 
to a set of well- defined probabilities have come from economists with 
otherwise quite different worldviews, like Frank Knight, John Maynard 
Keynes, George L.S. Shackle and Friedrich von Hayek. In 1921, Knight 
distinguished between risk –the case in which there is an objective prob-
ability and it is known– from subjective probability –when there “is no 
valid basis of any kind for classifying instances” (Knight 1921, p.225). 
Keynes expresses this in a similar way in his famous 1937 paper: “about 
these matters there is no scientific basis on which to form any calculable 
probability whatever. We simply do not know” (Keynes 1937, p. 113).  An 
implication may be that when people apply probabilities to these matters 
they are only making an arbitrary judgment in order to act –a kind of 
“impulse” driving the way in which agents evaluate their decision scenario. 
Economic analysis has an essentially self-referential nature: the observer 
tries to find representations of a system that evolves through the actions 
of agents who behave on the basis of perceptions and beliefs about the 
performance of the same system as it affects their opportunities and re-
strictions. The representation that the analyst seeks must, in some way, 
include a depiction of how agents go about the business of understanding 
the economic context in which they operate. This seemingly abstruse is-
1 See Ian Hacking (1975) for a history of probability; also Jacovkis and Perazzo (2012). 
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sue is in fact quite pertinent in applied work: when discussing issues of 
sustainability, an analyst is in fact asking about the quality of the expecta-
tions expressed in ongoing plans and decisions.  
The usual practice in economic analysis (based on the suggestions of dis-
tinguished theorists such as Frank Ramsey, Bruno de Finetti, and mainly 
Leonard Savage 1954) presumes that people behave as if they had a sub-
jective a priori probability about future events that can be discovered by 
observing their decisions a posteriori. This notion, substantially differ-
ent from Knight’s idea of uncertainty as “non- objective” likelihood, is 
often complemented by the (“rational expectations”) assumption that the 
probabilities that agents use in their decisions are those that actually mea-
sure the chances of the possible realizations of the quantities of interest, 
viewed as stochastic variables: here, rationality is somehow equated with 
full knowledge. The approach (which, indeed, admits variants of different 
sorts, like the introduction of learning dynamics), lends itself readily to 
formal modeling.
The uses of “objectifying” devices in social analysis have been much dis-
cussed. As the anthropologist and philosopher Claude Lévi-Strauss asserts, 
the effort to “mathematize” –to extract the quantitative aspects of obser-
vations and measure them–, is a legitimate ambition, but may imply a 
trade-off: “what we gain in meaning, we lose in precision and the inverse” 
(Lévi-Strauss 1954, p.647).  The simplifying ethos may obtain precision 
at the expense of realism, or generality; at the same time, purely qualita-
tive expositions can fall into vagueness, or into avoidable ambiguities and 
inconsistencies, leading to the need to “interpret” arguments which could 
otherwise have been made clear. One should beware of big methodologi-
cal pronouncements pretending to dictate how to carry out the analysis of 
each and every phenomenon or scientific problem. Rigor does not always 
imply precision or exactness, or their opposites.
In this instance, when considering the family of economic events describ-
able as crises, we are dealing both with intricate economic processes and 
with subtle questions about how people form views about the future and 
react to them. There are two different problems involved in the lack of 
certainty: one epistemological –we do not know– and the other ontologi-
cal –there is no ontological grounds on which to base knowledge. When 
the problem is epistemological we might have the hope of overcoming it, 
but when it is ontological, there is no such chance.
One can distinguish three situations. In the first, one can assume that there 
is an objective probability for the relevant event, and that its magnitude 
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can be approximately established. Here, probability is not an ontological 
but an epistemological phenomenon: “it is not some feature of the world, 
which we seek to discover, but rather it is a way of dealing with the world” 
(Weatherford 1982, p. 47). The second possibility is that the probability 
is still “out there”, but is not known, and agents treat their problem as 
one involving risk, for pragmatic reasons. Then, from the point of view 
of studying behavior, probability is an assertion about someone’s mind, 
not about the events (Weatherford 1982, p. 234). The third type of un-
certainty, also called “uncertainty as unawareness” or “fundamental uncer-
tainty”: given the character of reality the probability is not unknown, but 
unknowable2. But that does not necessarily mean that agents take those 
conditions as given: they may rationalize their circumstances and make 
their decisions under the impression that they are capable of predicting 
their environment with some accuracy, or of attributing reliable likeli-
hoods to alternative scenarios (this could be applicable in particular to 
sophisticated agents like financial operators). 
To sum up: the analysis of crises requires addressing questions about the 
attainable knowledge on the evolution of the economy from the perspec-
tive of an outside observer and from that of the actual agents; the analyst 
must include among his topics of investigation the procedures that the 
economic actors employ in trying to “make sense” of their conditions and 
to form expectations.
2. Accounts of the crisis: frictions, fat tails, rare events and deep 
uncertainties.
The analysis of crises must deal with this contrast between the ex-post 
appearance of “transparency” of the bursting bubble and the necessary 
opacity that made it develop (like in the image in Taleb 2010, of a black 
swan as a seemingly impossible animal before it has been observed, and an 
unremarkable one after it has been shown to exist). In the interpretations 
of the recent international crisis, one can find the tension mentioned by 
Bernstein between “those who assert that the best decisions are based on 
quantifications and numbers, determined by the statistical patterns of the 
past, and those who base their decisions on more subjective degrees of 
belief about the uncertain future” (Bernstein 1996, p. 6).
2 In some sense, this begs the question of how to know the impossibility of knowing. It may be 
noted that, in some practical contexts, the behaviour of agents can lead to a more or less direct 
interpretation in (perhaps implicit) probabilistic terms. When an individual buys a bond with 
some yield premium with respect to the “safe asset”, it seems reasonable to infer that he is acting 
as if the chance that he assigns to the event of total default does not exceed some (calculable) 
limit.
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In systems with fixed structures and performance, which can be charac-
terized by constant probability distributions, expectations may converge 
asymptotically to those determined by the realized laws of motion. “In the 
short-run, subjective probabilistic expectations need not coincide with 
the presumed immutable objective probabilities. Today’s decision mak-
ers, therefore, can make short-run errors regarding the uncertain future. 
Agents, however, should “learn” from these short-run mistakes so that 
subjective probabilities or decision weights tend to converge to an ac-
curate description of the programmed external reality”3(Davidson 2009). 
Thus, in these worlds, “averages calculated from past observations can-
not be persistently different from the time average of future outcomes” 
(Davidson 1991), and knowledge accumulates as time passes. Eventually, 
if enough time is allowed to obtain very large samples of realizations, the 
observer can extract all the potential information about the properties of 
the system: what is left is “irreducible” randomness described by a known 
distribution. 
However, macroeconomic crises are large and infrequent phenomena. 
They are not “normal” because they often do not seem to form part of the 
scenarios contemplated by agents, and also because they may involve or-
ders of magnitude of some variables which would have vanishing chances 
of being observed under Gaussian distributions with parameters drawn 
from past history. Even though the economy could be represented by giv-
en, fixed probability densities, the existence of such events would anyway 
call into question the applicability of distributions that treat extreme real-
izations as practically impossible. As an implication, actual decision-mak-
ing, policy design and economic analysis alike should take into account 
the “fat tails” in the relevant distributions. Terzi summarizes thus Taleb´s 
related Black Swan argument:
“…Intractable uncertainty means that there exist outlier events 
with the property of carrying a large impact on our lives. And 
because we do not have much hope to forecast these better, we 
can only attempt to shield the system from (inevitable) forecast-
ing errors. Because the possibility of Black Swan Events (BSE) is 
incalculable, the best defense from uncertainty is to build a robust 
financial system, more resilient to BSE... [E] even using the best 
of our abilities, and although BSE follows a predetermined (yet 
unknown) statistical path, there will always be events that are so 
rare that we cannot possibly predict them… In Taleb’s world, the 
possibility of surprises (BSE) is typical and deplorably disregarded 
by most agents and, for this reason, the economic system lacks 
3 This conclusion depends on the stability properties of the learning algorithm. In the present 
context, that technical matter can be left aside.
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robustness” (Terzi 2010)
Actually, forming beliefs and expectations about “non-routine” and possi-
bly “life-changing” events like macroeconomic crises carries special prob-
lems. As phenomena with a deep actual significance, agents and analysts 
should have strong incentives to understand and anticipate them. Crises 
are indeed memorable events, which leave persistent traces in beliefs, at-
titudes and behaviors of the people who live through them (Heymann 
2002; Malmendier and Nagel 2010). However, although it may be tempt-
ing to look for timing regularities on the basis of a small number of in-
stances, crises have no definite periodicity, and they involve processes at 
relatively long time scales. This by itself constrains the vivid experiences 
that the population at a given moment may have accumulated and, from 
the point of view of the analysts, it also brings down the number of perti-
nent “data points” on a specific economy with which to work. If there are 
some “deep probabilities” hidden somewhere, this feature would restrict 
the chances of learning about them with any precision.      
This calls attention to the much discussed issue of ergodicity. Econom-
ic systems change over time. Their development is very much driven by 
technical, organizational and behavioral evolution; the notion is hardly 
controversial. From the perspective of individuals, learning and adapta-
tion to the environment take place on a daily basis, and they modify the 
context in which others carry out their activities: the future “depends on 
our intentions and beliefs” and, therefore, “it is open” (Skidelsky 2011, 
p.3).Of course, this raises the questions of to what extent we (observers) 
can extrapolate to a specific case patterns identifiable in other times and 
places, and what actual agents do about the matter. 
When the system under consideration undergoes structural change, un-
certainty may persist, even if the available information accumulates over 
time (North 2005, p. 22). Intuitively, as new realizations are observed, 
older ones become “obsolete”. Thus, the relevant sample never becomes 
very large, since “primitive” data points should be disregarded effectively 
as corresponding to behavior patterns that no longer apply. As a corollary, 
the parameters can never be estimated with high precision. 
The pertinence of these effects depends on the time scales, both of the 
processes and the analytical, or decision scenarios. In normal times, we 
(agents) carry out our daily activities with the implicit assumption that the 
environment will not experience rapid unforeseen changes (the break-
down in the presumption of “business as usual” over short time spans 
Filo Econ (2013) 1: 71-8678
CIECE
is precisely one of the characterizing features of crises and episodes of 
extreme macro instability, and the source of considerable economic dis-
turbance in those instances). Thus, the problems associated with forming 
expectations in non-ergodic contexts would operate especially when the 
outcomes of decisions depend in some way on the accuracy of anticipa-
tions about economic variables over long time horizons, as it happens in 
macroeconomic crises, viewed as indicators of big discrepancies between 
past and current wealth perceptions. 
The extrapolation of observed conditions may be a plausible heuristic, in 
some circumstances: “the existing of the state of affairs will continue in-
definitely, except in so far as we have specific reasons to expect a change” 
(Keynes 1936, p. 148). Simple-minded extrapolation is likely to overstate 
the naivety of the reasoning employed in making important economic de-
cisions. It is a matter of common observation (in Argentina particularly) 
that many people show a keen interest in interpreting economic ups and 
downs, and that they spend time and effort trying to “make sense” of  eco-
nomic information. That is: they operate as “model- makers” even if their 
models are informal, and not necessarily appropriate. A crisis would then 
represent a failure of those working models which, for practical purposes, 
may have shared features with those held by influential economists, as in 
the “long list of leading academics, investors, and the U.S policy makers” 
(Reinhart and Rogoff 2009, p. 208) who argued for the sustainability of 
the macroeconomic trajectory that preceded the crisis.
Timely spotting structural changes and deciphering their potential conse-
quences are prime analytical problems, which agents must also confront 
somehow. Two types of error may arise: lack of response to an actual, 
permanent shift in economic patterns (misguided induction), and overre-
action to indications of change, disregarding past experience as irrelevant 
(the “this time is different” syndrome as in Reinhart and Rogoff 2009). 
The path leading to crises often shows (retrospectively) indications of the 
second type of reaction. 
It is in the nature of the facts that over-expansions of wealth perceptions 
and debt are associated with economic signals that lend themselves to con-
flicting interpretations. Consider the following scenario. A major techni-
cal change emerges that may modify the way of doing business across the 
economy, and motivates the creation of numerous start-up companies, 
which go to the financial market to fund their establishment and growth. 
For some observers, while these new activities entail risks, they are the 
“wave of the future” and are likely to generate high profits, for their initia-
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tors and also for others that will benefit from the innovation. It follows 
that asset processes should rise, credit should reasonably increase, and if 
consumers spend on the basis of their expected prosperity, that need not 
cause concern. But alternative interpretations of events are strongly dif-
ferent: indeed, there may be something interesting in the new technolo-
gies, but many of them could  prove to be false starts, and in any case their 
overall effects are unlikely to correspond to the exaggerated enthusiasm 
that fashionable opinion is propagating. 
Solvency and sustainability conditions (which are ultimately the objects 
under scrutiny) are essentially prospective concepts. Their assessment 
must somehow rely, formally or informally, on past experience (whether 
in the economy in question or in others); that requires a judgment about 
the relevance of the available information. In concrete instances, it seems 
likely that the impressions gathered from analogies with other cases and 
from more or less refined data analysis will be mixed: some may favor the 
view that solid “fundamentals”4 will validate the current debt decisions, 
while others can point to the development of an artificial boom that will 
end badly. Which attitude will prevail? Who will turn out to be right? The 
answer to the first question can depend critically on where common sense 
opinion places the burden of proof, since no side would be able to gather 
firm, convincing evidence pointing in its direction. 
The forms of reasoning prevalent on the road to the crisis may have been 
mistaken, but this does not imply that they should be viewed as arbitrary: 
“there is always a very real basis [of real opportunities to invest lucratively] 
for the ‘new era’ psychology before it runs away with all its victims” (I. 
Fisher 1933). However, there is also much cold logic in the decisions that 
result in a crisis. “Slow thinking” (Kahneman 2010) does use the mind´s 
rational faculties, but does not lead necessarily to rational expectations in 
its usual meaning in Economics. 
Understanding the “model-making” heuristics used by agents in their 
economic activity seems an open issue for macro analysis, particularly 
that which is concerned with crises and large-scale phenomena; address-
ing it would require some sort of “empirical” or “positive” epistemology 
4 Economic fundamentals (e.g. productivities, income levels, budgetary positions) are often 
treated as if they could correspond to objective notions. However, that cannot be so in this 
context, since the relevant fundamentals refer necessarily to future realizations. Also, although 
the point is quite obvious, it may be remarked here that the common distinction between “back-
ward-looking” and “forward-looking” expectations can be highly misleading. The procedures 
used to form anticipations may be more or less sophisticated or alert to news contained in sig-
nals from the environment. However, by definition, all expectations look to the future; and, as a 
strict matter of fact, they must depend on past information, since there is nothing else on which 
to build an image of things to come.
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directed towards the procedures and criteria for information processing 
employed in practice. This would imply paying attention to the choice of 
starting references on the part of agents in order to base their interpreta-
tions, that is, to their activity of abduction, especially when faced with 
potentially new situations (Crespo et al. 2010). 
That is a big task for the future. In the meantime, a point that may deserve 
attention, and which lends itself to qualitative exploration, is the way in 
which people who hold certain views about the sustainability of a macro-
economic over-expansion deal with “anomalies” which can challenge their 
opinions. In this regard, attitudes that “rationalize the bubble”, by finding 
reassuring explanations for potentially disturbing news can be part of the 
“coping strategies” of agents, and at the same time they would contribute 
to prolong and propagate the boom, and to amplify the subsequent down-
turn. We address that feature in the next section. 
3. Rationalizing the bubble.
A quite long list of candidates has been put forward as possible factors in 
the generation of the bubble that burst in the recent international crisis. 
Among them:
Errors in the design and implementation of monetary and financial poli-
cies, reflected in too-low interest rates and a lax regulatory environment 
which allowed excessive degrees of leverage and, especially, the growth of 
markets for sophisticated credit instruments,  “new financial instruments 
like ABS (Asset-backed securities), CDO (collateral debt obligations) and 
CDS (credit default swaps). Those products were the result of the mort-
gage securitization, which developed rapidly as US house prices rose 124 
per cent between 1997 and 2006. Mortgage volumes, including subprime 
crisis subprime mortgages, increased significantly during this time pe-
riod. As those loans became securitized, uncontrollable risk-taking com-
menced.” (Svetlova and Fiedler 2011, p. 153).
Malincentives in the re-packaging and sale of assets, which made loan is-
suers unconcerned about the potential repayment of debts: “Accordingly 
there was a great profit incentive for mortgage originators to search out 
any potential home buyers (including subprime ones) and provide them 
with a mortgage. The originator could then profitably sell, usually within 
30 days, these mortgages, to an underwriter, or act as underwriter to sell 
to the public a package of exotic mortgage backed securities (MBS). The 
originator therefore had no fear of default if the borrower could at least 
make his first monthly mortgage payment” (Davidson 2009, p. 192).
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The rising inequality trend in the US (along with other economies) which 
was associated with stagnant or declining real incomes of large segments 
of the population: the impact of these developments on demand may have 
led sellers to use credit expansion as a compensating device, with the 
consequence that financing was granted to ultimately insolvent borrowers 
(Rajan 2010).
The US was a major contributor to the “global imbalances” through its 
current account deficit, which reflected low savings levels, and was fi-
nanced in part by credit originated in China´s large trade surpluses. These 
flows could not be sustained indefinitely, and the adjustment could be 
disruptive (Obstfeld and Rogoff 2009).
The possible pertinence of these effects in the specific case of the US 
is quite clear. However, a more demanding question would be whether, 
individually or jointly, they may represent necessary or sufficient requi-
sites for a crisis.  The answer seems to be definitely negative. Large-scale 
crises have been observed in economies with tightly constrained mon-
etary policies and a set of relatively few and simple financial contracts, 
lacking the extremely complicated instruments that were traded in the 
US, and the markets for securities that “dispersed” the risks of classes of 
credits like mortgages. Recent history also shows examples of crises in 
countries where income distribution had improved significantly during 
the boom (Greece; Gialdi 2012), and in economies running current ac-
count surpluses (e.g. Japan).  Conversely, the arguments just sketched do 
not identify sufficient conditions, because they do not provide an explana-
tion of how and why bad debts are generated, given that it would be hard 
to admit that the non-fulfillment of contractual obligations is an outcome 
perfectly anticipated from the start: at some point, there must be a frus-
tration of previously held expectations. Thus, an account of the bubble 
and the crisis should consider the interaction between the characteristics 
of the economy identified as salient in terms of their relevance for the 
macroeconomic performance and the processes of expectation formation 
and the consequent behaviors. 
In fact, those features that retrospectively came to be generally seen as 
sources of weakness and fragility were apt to be interpreted quite oth-
erwise in their time by large and influential sectors of the public, either 
complacently or even as confidence-strengthening. Monetary policies that 
kept interest rate low could be viewed as promoting real growth, in the 
context of a macroeconomic “great moderation” (Blanchard and Simon 
2001; Bernanke 2004a), marked by strong demand and output increases 
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with smaller volatilities and an absence of inflationary pressures. In turn, 
these performances were interpreted as an indication of the success of 
economic policies in dampening macro instabilities, and the ability of the 
macro analysis in use to provide guides for that purpose5. Although there 
was some discussion about whether the central bank should be concerned 
about asset prices and not only about inflation in goods prices (Bernanke 
2004b; Gerthner 2006), the prevalent opinion (known as the “Greenspan 
doctrine”) held that there were no strong reasons to lean against upswings 
which could well be based on real economic improvements and, in any 
case, if the asset-price movement was eventually proven exaggerated and 
got reversed, policies could intervene to prevent the propagation of the 
shock, an argument that evoked the comparatively small macroeconomic 
impact of the reversal of the dot-com bubble some years before. Financial 
deregulation (embodied, in particular, in the repeal of the Glass-Steagall 
act that segmented the credit market in order to cushion the effect of as-
set price fluctuations on commercial banks) was supported by most of 
the mainstream analysts and practitioners (Zappia 2012); securitization of 
loans through derivatives of intricate design was seen as an ingenious form 
of diversifying risk and tailoring exposure to shocks to the specific condi-
tions of asset holders; thus, large earnings in the financial sector rewarded 
the real contribution of high-skilled productive activities6.
Behind these sanguine (and sometimes self-congratulatory) attitudes was 
the notion that real forces were changing the trend of the international 
economy in a way that would raise incomes and sustain higher asset prices. 
This supported the perception that a real estate bubble was “most un-
likely” and that that home-price increases “largely reflect strong economic 
fundamentals” was supported by Bernanke in 20057. The high spending in 
the US, and the associated international borrowing was interpreted as a 
more or less natural consequence of the strong propensity to lend in econ-
omies like China, Japan, Germany and Middle Eastern countries (a “global 
savings glut”), and the attractiveness of the US as a supplier of presumably 
safe assets (cf. Cooper 2004; Clarida 2005; Backus and Lambert 2005; 
Bernanke 2007).  The strong supply of funds, it was argued, was matched 
5 Robert Lucas, in his 2003 presidential address to the American Economic Association, ar-
gued that “the central problem of depression-prevention has been solved” (Lucas 2003); cf. also 
Blanchard (2008): “The state of macro is good”.
6 See, for example, Reinhart and Rogoff (2009):  “the top employees of the five largest invest-
ment banks divided a bonus pool of over $36 billion in 2007...”, while “... leaders in the financial 
sector argued that their high returns were the result of innovation and genuine value-added 
products”
7 Retrieved from http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/10/26/
AR2005102602255.html
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on the demand side by good investment prospects, as institutional and 
structural features of the US economy, such as the flexibility of labor, capi-
tal and product markets, made it especially well-suited to capitalize on the 
opportunities afforded by revolutionary new technologies.
The vision of a “new economy” was summarized by Eichengreen (2005) 
as implying that “U.S. consumption exceeds U.S. production because 
Americans stand to benefit disproportionately from the high return on 
investment in the United States. The anticipated rise in future incomes is 
captured by the ratio of household stock market wealth to personal dis-
posable income, which rose strongly in the 1990s.  Together with the ratio 
of household residential property wealth to personal disposable income 
and the yield on a ten-year Treasury bond, this stock market variable can 
explain most of the variation in U.S. personal savings rate in the last 40 
years.” Those opinions were shared in policy circles: Greenspan (2002) 
envisaged the emergence of a “productive miracle”, as the benefits of elec-
tronic technology propagated throughout the economy as a whole, creat-
ing a prosperity enhancing structural break. And, in any case, the implicit 
belief in the validity of the efficient market hypothesis, in its strong ver-
sion or in the form that “[the private sector] can judge the equilibrium of 
[housing] prices at least as well as any government bureaucrat” (Reinhart 
and Rogoff 2009, p. 212) supported a hands-off policy approach. 
Thus, wealth estimates seemed to be significantly exaggerated and risks 
severely undervalued; this is a central ingredient of a large boom-bust 
business cycle (Heymann and Sanguinetti 1998). Seen in retrospect, the 
judgments of large and authoritative groups of academics, policymakers 
and market participants shared a strong misperception of the economic 
process they were watching and deciding on. Although cognitive distor-
tions (such as confirmation biases) may have played a role in those errors, 
these do not appear to have originated from “emotional” or “irrational” 
(in the usual sense) responses, but were maintained for considerable pe-
riods of time by highly skilled individuals trained specifically for com-
plicated analytical tasks. The agents who surfed with the tide were not 
simply over-enthusiastic amateurs or mere extrapolators of past data. 
Rather than being incidental to a particular episode, the pattern arose 
in the whole spectrum of macroeconomic crises: the expectations that 
sustained the ultimately inconsistent behaviors in the upward phase were 
rationalized, sometimes by very sophisticated arguments, and relying on 
indisputable observable evidence. “Why did nobody see it coming? The 
queen of England snapped at his interlocutors in the London School of 
Economics (Svetlovaand Fiedler 2011). The query carries a complaint, 
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but also an analytical challenge for epistemologists and economists, to 
understand when, how and why prevalent intellectual and practical views 
of the world end up misinterpreting economic trends in such costly ways. 
4. Concluding remarks.
And then: “the entire intellectual edifice collapsed”, in the words of  Alan 
Greenspan in 2008. The system was shocked by the crisis, hitting not from 
outside the economic system, but from its own core.  A crisis represents 
by its very nature an occasion for large re- evaluations of economic op-
portunities and choices, in a rapidly changing scenario. While the up-
ward phase is marked by a probably slow drift of sustainable economic 
trends away from the anticipated expected evolution (“the development 
of increasingly optimistic forecasts alongside economics forces that can-
not justify those expectations” (Harvey 2010)), the eruption of the crisis 
sharply shortens time horizons: agents must decide “on the spot”, and the 
economy appears to be near a bifurcation, so that its future seems to be 
in play from one moment to the next (Heymann and Leijonhufvud 2013). 
If the members of the herd are nervous, and made to be alert to danger 
signs, stampedes may easily happen. The representation of people´s cogni-
tive processes, decisions and interactions “in crisis” is another open issue 
to be addressed. Overall, macroeconomics faces a reconsideration of its 
description of expectations and behavior, in a concrete and fact-oriented 
fashion. It remains to be seen if that demand is met.  
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